ACGP-1007: Security Considerations¶
Status: Draft
Last Updated: 2026-01-08
Spec ID: ACGP-1007
Normative Keywords: MUST, SHOULD, MAY (per RFC 2119)
Abstract¶
This document specifies the comprehensive security framework for the Agentic Cognitive Governance Protocol (ACGP). It defines the threat model, security controls, cryptographic requirements, access control mechanisms, emergency override procedures, and incident response procedures necessary to protect ACGP implementations from malicious actors, data breaches, and system compromises. This specification addresses security at all layers of the protocol, from message-level encryption to system-wide defense strategies, ensuring that AI governance remains trustworthy and tamper-resistant.
Table of Contents¶
- Introduction
- Threat Model
- Security Architecture
- Cryptographic Requirements
- Authentication and Authorization
- Data Protection and Privacy
- Network Security
- Agent Security
- Supply Chain Security
- Emergency Override Procedures
- Incident Response
- Security Monitoring and Auditing
- Compliance and Regulatory Security
- Security Testing Requirements
- Conformance Requirements
- References
1. Introduction¶
Security is fundamental to ACGP's mission of governing AI agents. A compromised governance system could allow malicious agents to operate without oversight, manipulate intervention decisions, or expose sensitive operational data. This specification provides comprehensive security requirements to protect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of ACGP systems.
1.1 Security Objectives¶
- Integrity: Ensure governance decisions cannot be tampered with
- Confidentiality: Protect sensitive agent data and operational information
- Availability: Maintain governance capabilities under attack
- Non-repudiation: Create undeniable audit trails
- Defense in Depth: Multiple layers of security controls
1.2 Requirements Language¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
2. Threat Model¶
2.1 Threat Actors¶
| Actor | Capability | Motivation | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious Agent | Internal access, API knowledge | Bypass governance, escalate privileges | Critical |
| Compromised Insider | Administrative access, system knowledge | Data theft, sabotage | Critical |
| External Attacker | Network access, exploit tools | Data breach, service disruption | High |
| Nation State | Advanced persistent threat capabilities | Espionage, manipulation | Critical |
| Competitor | Limited resources, targeted attacks | IP theft, competitive advantage | Medium |
| Script Kiddie | Public tools, limited skill | Disruption, reputation damage | Low |
2.2 Attack Vectors¶
graph LR
subgraph "External Attacks"
A1[Network Intrusion]
A2[API Exploitation]
A3[DDoS Attacks]
A4[Supply Chain]
end
subgraph "Internal Attacks"
B1[Rogue Agents]
B2[Privilege Escalation]
B3[Data Exfiltration]
B4[Insider Threat]
end
subgraph "Protocol Attacks"
C1[Message Tampering]
C2[Replay Attacks]
C3[Man-in-the-Middle]
C4[Injection Attacks]
end
subgraph "Governance Attacks"
D1[Blueprint Manipulation]
D2[Trust Score Gaming]
D3[Collusion Attacks]
D4[Decision Poisoning]
end
A1 --> SYSTEM[ACGP System]
B1 --> SYSTEM
C1 --> SYSTEM
D1 --> SYSTEM
style SYSTEM fill:#ff6b6b
2.3 Threat Matrix¶
| Threat | Impact | Likelihood | Mitigation Priority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agent Escape | Catastrophic | Medium | Critical |
| Governance Bypass | Severe | High | Critical |
| Data Breach | Major | Medium | High |
| Service Disruption | Moderate | High | High |
| Trust Manipulation | Major | Medium | High |
| Audit Tampering | Severe | Low | Medium |
| Resource Exhaustion | Minor | High | Medium |
3. Security Architecture¶
3.1 Defense in Depth Model¶
graph TB
subgraph "Layer 7: Governance Security"
GS[Blueprint Integrity]
TS[Trust Verification]
DS[Decision Validation]
end
subgraph "Layer 6: Application Security"
AS[Input Validation]
SS[Session Management]
ES[Error Handling]
end
subgraph "Layer 5: Data Security"
DE[Encryption at Rest]
DT[Encryption in Transit]
DM[Data Masking]
end
subgraph "Layer 4: Identity Security"
AUTH[Authentication]
AUTHZ[Authorization]
MFA[Multi-Factor Auth]
end
subgraph "Layer 3: Network Security"
FW[Firewall]
IDS[IDS/IPS]
SEG[Segmentation]
end
subgraph "Layer 2: Host Security"
OS[OS Hardening]
AV[Anti-Malware]
EDR[EDR Solution]
end
subgraph "Layer 1: Physical Security"
DC[Data Center]
HSM[Hardware Security]
ACC[Access Control]
end
3.2 Zero Trust Principles¶
zero_trust_implementation:
never_trust_always_verify:
- Verify every transaction
- No implicit trust based on network location
- Continuous validation of security posture
least_privilege_access:
- Default deny all
- Time-bound access grants
- Regular privilege audits
- Just-in-time elevation
assume_breach:
- Comprehensive logging
- Anomaly detection
- Micro-segmentation
- Incident response readiness
verify_explicitly:
- Multi-factor authentication
- Device health checks
- Risk-based access
- Continuous monitoring
3.3 Security Zones¶
| Zone | Trust Level | Access Controls | Data Classification |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public | Untrusted | Rate limiting, DDoS protection | Public only |
| DMZ | Low | API authentication, input validation | Public + Internal |
| Application | Medium | Role-based access, audit logging | Internal + Sensitive |
| Governance | High | MFA, privileged access management | Sensitive + Restricted |
| Secure Core | Critical | Air gap capable, HSM required | Restricted + Secret |
4. Cryptographic Requirements¶
4.1 Algorithm Requirements¶
STANDARDIZED: All ACGP implementations MUST use ES256 (ECDSA with P-256 and SHA-256) for message signing.
| Use Case | Algorithm | Key Size | Lifecycle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Message Signing | ES256 (ECDSA) | 256-bit | 1 year |
| TLS | TLS 1.3 | 2048-bit RSA / 256-bit ECC | 2 years |
| Data Encryption | AES-256-GCM | 256-bit | 90 days |
| Key Derivation | PBKDF2 | N/A | Per use |
| Hashing | SHA-256 | N/A | N/A |
| HMAC | HMAC-SHA256 | 256-bit | 30 days |
4.2 Key Management¶
class KeyManagement:
def __init__(self):
self.hsm = HardwareSecurityModule()
self.key_rotation_schedule = {
'signing': timedelta(days=365),
'encryption': timedelta(days=90),
'session': timedelta(hours=24),
'api': timedelta(days=30)
}
def generate_key(self, key_type: str) -> Key:
# Generate in HSM for critical keys
if key_type in ['master', 'signing', 'encryption']:
return self.hsm.generate_key(key_type)
# Software generation for ephemeral keys
return self.software_generate(key_type)
def rotate_key(self, key_id: str) -> Key:
old_key = self.get_key(key_id)
new_key = self.generate_key(old_key.type)
# Maintain old key for decryption
self.archive_key(old_key, retention_days=30)
# Update all references
self.update_key_references(old_key.id, new_key.id)
return new_key
4.3 Cryptographic Envelope¶
All sensitive messages MUST use this envelope structure:
{
"version": "1.0",
"algorithm": "AES-256-GCM",
"encrypted_data": "base64_encoded_ciphertext",
"encrypted_key": "rsa_encrypted_aes_key",
"iv": "base64_encoded_iv",
"signature": {
"algorithm": "ES256",
"value": "base64_encoded_signature",
"key_id": "signing_key_identifier",
"timestamp": "2025-01-15T10:00:00Z"
},
"metadata": {
"content_type": "application/json",
"compression": "gzip",
"key_encryption_algorithm": "RSA-OAEP"
}
}
5. Authentication and Authorization¶
5.1 Authentication Requirements¶
5.1.1 Agent Authentication¶
class AgentAuthenticator:
def authenticate_agent(self, credentials: dict) -> AuthResult:
# Step 1: Verify agent certificate
if not self.verify_certificate(credentials['certificate']):
return AuthResult(success=False, reason="Invalid certificate")
# Step 2: Check certificate revocation
if self.is_revoked(credentials['certificate']):
return AuthResult(success=False, reason="Certificate revoked")
# Step 3: Validate agent identity
agent_id = self.extract_agent_id(credentials['certificate'])
if not self.validate_agent_exists(agent_id):
return AuthResult(success=False, reason="Unknown agent")
# Step 4: Verify proof of possession
challenge = self.generate_challenge()
response = credentials.get('challenge_response')
if not self.verify_challenge(challenge, response, agent_id):
return AuthResult(success=False, reason="Failed challenge")
# Step 5: Check agent status
if self.is_suspended(agent_id):
return AuthResult(success=False, reason="Agent suspended")
return AuthResult(
success=True,
agent_id=agent_id,
acl_tier=self.get_acl_tier(agent_id),
session_token=self.generate_session_token(agent_id)
)
5.1.2 Human Authentication¶
| Factor | Requirement | Implementation |
|---|---|---|
| Something you know | Password/PIN | Argon2id hashing, 12+ characters |
| Something you have | Token/Device | TOTP/FIDO2/WebAuthn |
| Something you are | Biometric | Optional third factor |
| Somewhere you are | Location | Network/GPS verification |
5.2 Authorization Model¶
rbac_model:
roles:
super_admin:
permissions: ["*"]
mfa_required: true
session_timeout: 15m
governance_admin:
permissions:
- blueprint.create
- blueprint.update
- registry.manage
- agent.suspend
mfa_required: true
session_timeout: 30m
operator:
permissions:
- agent.view
- intervention.review
- alert.acknowledge
mfa_required: false
session_timeout: 2h
auditor:
permissions:
- logs.read
- reports.generate
mfa_required: false
session_timeout: 8h
attribute_based_constraints:
- role: governance_admin
constraint: time_of_day IN business_hours
- role: operator
constraint: ip_address IN corporate_network
- role: auditor
constraint: read_only = true
5.3 Session Management¶
class SecureSessionManager:
def create_session(self, auth_result: AuthResult) -> Session:
session = Session(
id=secrets.token_urlsafe(32),
user_id=auth_result.user_id,
created_at=datetime.utcnow(),
expires_at=datetime.utcnow() + self.get_timeout(auth_result.role),
ip_address=request.remote_addr,
user_agent=request.user_agent,
csrf_token=secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
)
# Bind session to device
session.device_fingerprint = self.calculate_fingerprint(request)
# Store encrypted in Redis
self.redis.setex(
f"session:{session.id}",
session.ttl,
self.encrypt(session.to_json())
)
return session
6. Data Protection and Privacy¶
6.1 Data Classification¶
| Level | Description | Examples | Protection Requirements |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public | No impact if disclosed | Documentation | None required |
| Internal | Limited impact | Metrics, logs | Access control |
| Sensitive | Moderate impact | Agent configs, blueprints | Encryption at rest |
| Restricted | Severe impact | Keys, credentials | HSM storage |
| Secret | Catastrophic impact | Master keys, root certs | Air-gapped storage |
6.2 Encryption Requirements¶
6.2.1 Data at Rest¶
class DataEncryption:
def encrypt_at_rest(self, data: bytes, classification: str) -> bytes:
if classification == 'public':
return data
# Get appropriate key
if classification in ['restricted', 'secret']:
key = self.hsm.get_data_encryption_key()
else:
key = self.get_software_key()
# Encrypt with AES-256-GCM
cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_GCM)
nonce = cipher.nonce
ciphertext, tag = cipher.encrypt_and_digest(data)
# Return encrypted envelope
return json.dumps({
'ciphertext': base64.b64encode(ciphertext).decode(),
'nonce': base64.b64encode(nonce).decode(),
'tag': base64.b64encode(tag).decode(),
'classification': classification,
'timestamp': datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
}).encode()
6.2.2 Data in Transit¶
All data in transit MUST be encrypted using: - TLS 1.3 minimum - Perfect forward secrecy - Certificate pinning for known endpoints - Mutual TLS for service-to-service
6.3 Privacy Controls¶
privacy_requirements:
pii_handling:
detection: automatic_scanning
storage: encrypted_with_field_level_encryption
retention: 90_days_max
deletion: secure_overwrite
data_minimization:
- collect_only_necessary
- automatic_expiration
- purpose_limitation
- no_secondary_use
anonymization:
techniques:
- k_anonymity: 5
- differential_privacy: epsilon=1.0
- tokenization: reversible_with_key
consent_management:
- explicit_consent_required
- granular_controls
- withdrawal_mechanism
- audit_trail
7. Network Security¶
7.1 Network Segmentation¶
graph LR
subgraph "Internet"
USER[Users]
AGENT[Agents]
end
subgraph "DMZ"
LB[Load Balancer]
WAF[Web App Firewall]
API[API Gateway]
end
subgraph "Application Network"
GS[Governance Stewards]
PE[Policy Engine]
end
subgraph "Data Network"
RDB[(ReflectionDB)]
REG[(Registry)]
end
subgraph "Management Network"
ADMIN[Admin Systems]
MON[Monitoring]
end
USER --> WAF
AGENT --> WAF
WAF --> LB
LB --> API
API --> GS
GS --> PE
PE --> RDB
GS --> REG
ADMIN --> MON
MON -.-> GS
style WAF fill:#ff9999
style API fill:#99ff99
7.2 Firewall Rules¶
firewall_rules:
ingress:
- name: https_public
source: 0.0.0.0/0
destination: dmz
port: 443
protocol: tcp
action: allow
- name: admin_vpn
source: vpn_network
destination: management
port: 22
protocol: tcp
action: allow
- name: deny_all
source: any
destination: any
port: any
protocol: any
action: deny
egress:
- name: updates
source: application
destination: update_servers
port: 443
protocol: tcp
action: allow
- name: monitoring
source: application
destination: monitoring
port: 8443
protocol: tcp
action: allow
7.3 DDoS Protection¶
class DDoSProtection:
def __init__(self):
self.rate_limits = {
'global': 10000, # requests per second
'per_ip': 100, # requests per second per IP
'per_agent': 50, # requests per second per agent
}
self.blacklist = set()
self.whitelist = set()
def check_request(self, request):
ip = request.remote_addr
# Check blacklist
if ip in self.blacklist:
return False, "IP blacklisted"
# Skip rate limiting for whitelist
if ip in self.whitelist:
return True, "Whitelisted"
# Check rate limits
if self.exceeds_rate_limit(ip):
self.blacklist.add(ip)
return False, "Rate limit exceeded"
# Check for attack patterns
if self.detect_attack_pattern(request):
return False, "Attack pattern detected"
return True, "OK"
8. Agent Security¶
8.1 Agent Isolation¶
agent_isolation:
process_isolation:
- separate_namespaces
- resource_quotas
- seccomp_profiles
- capability_dropping
network_isolation:
- vlan_per_acl_tier
- egress_filtering
- no_direct_internet
- service_mesh_only
storage_isolation:
- encrypted_volumes
- no_shared_storage
- temporary_filesystems
- quota_enforcement
8.2 Agent Behavior Monitoring¶
class AgentSecurityMonitor:
def __init__(self):
self.baseline = {}
self.anomaly_threshold = 3.0 # standard deviations
def monitor_agent(self, agent_id: str, trace: CognitiveTrace):
metrics = self.extract_metrics(trace)
# Check for suspicious patterns
if self.is_suspicious(metrics):
self.trigger_alert(agent_id, "Suspicious behavior detected")
# Check for escape attempts
if self.detect_escape_attempt(trace):
self.immediate_halt(agent_id, "Escape attempt detected")
# Update baseline
self.update_baseline(agent_id, metrics)
def detect_escape_attempt(self, trace):
escape_indicators = [
'privilege_escalation',
'sandbox_breakout',
'code_injection',
'self_modification',
'unauthorized_spawning'
]
for indicator in escape_indicators:
if self.check_indicator(trace, indicator):
return True
return False
8.3 Preventing Agent Collusion¶
def detect_collusion(agent_communications):
# Build communication graph
graph = build_communication_graph(agent_communications)
# Detect suspicious patterns
patterns = {
'circular_delegation': detect_cycles(graph),
'rapid_coordination': detect_burst_communication(graph),
'data_aggregation': detect_data_sharing(graph),
'synchronized_actions': detect_coordination(graph)
}
# Calculate collusion score
collusion_score = sum(patterns.values()) / len(patterns)
if collusion_score > 0.7:
return True, patterns
return False, {}
9. Supply Chain Security¶
9.1 Dependency Management¶
dependency_security:
scanning:
- vulnerability_scanning: daily
- license_compliance: on_change
- malware_detection: on_import
verification:
- signature_verification: required
- checksum_validation: required
- source_validation: approved_repos_only
policies:
- no_deprecated_packages
- no_unmaintained_packages
- security_updates_within_7_days
- review_required_for_new_deps
9.2 Blueprint Security¶
class BlueprintSecurity:
def validate_blueprint(self, blueprint: dict) -> ValidationResult:
# Check for injection attacks
if self.contains_injection(blueprint):
return ValidationResult(False, "Injection detected")
# Verify signature (ES256 required)
if not self.verify_signature_es256(blueprint):
return ValidationResult(False, "Invalid ES256 signature")
# Check for malicious patterns
if self.detect_malicious_patterns(blueprint):
return ValidationResult(False, "Malicious pattern detected")
# Validate against schema
if not self.validate_schema(blueprint):
return ValidationResult(False, "Schema validation failed")
return ValidationResult(True, "Valid")
def contains_injection(self, blueprint):
dangerous_patterns = [
r'<script',
r'javascript:',
r'eval\(',
r'exec\(',
r'\$\{.*\}',
r'`.*`'
]
blueprint_str = json.dumps(blueprint)
for pattern in dangerous_patterns:
if re.search(pattern, blueprint_str, re.IGNORECASE):
return True
return False
10. Emergency Override Procedures¶
10.1 Emergency Override Levels¶
| ACL Tier | Approvers Required | Roles | Response Time | Documentation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACL-0 to ACL-2 | 1 | Admin | Immediate | Standard logging |
| ACL-3 to ACL-5 | 2 | Admin + Security | Immediate | Full incident report |
10.2 Emergency Override Process¶
emergency_override:
procedure:
step_1:
action: Identify incident severity
criteria:
- critical: Data breach, agent escape, system compromise
- high: Unauthorized access, policy violation
- medium: Performance degradation, configuration error
step_2:
action: Determine authorization level required
logic: |
if acl_tier <= 2:
required_approvers = 1
required_roles = ['admin']
else:
required_approvers = 2
required_roles = ['admin', 'security']
step_3:
action: Execute authorization workflow
substeps:
- Generate override request with incident details
- Route to required approvers
- Wait for approval (max 5 minutes for critical)
- Log all approval decisions
step_4:
action: Execute override action
options:
- immediate_halt: Stop all agent operations
- isolation: Network and process isolation
- credential_revocation: Revoke all API keys/tokens
- cascaded_shutdown: Halt sub-agents recursively
step_5:
action: Document override
requirements:
- Incident description
- Override reason and justification
- Approver identities and timestamps
- Actions taken
- Impact assessment
step_6:
action: Notify stakeholders
recipients:
immediate: [ciso, governance_admin, on_call_engineer]
within_1h: [management, legal, compliance]
within_24h: [affected_users, audit_team]
10.3 Emergency Override Implementation¶
class EmergencyOverride:
def execute_override(self, agent_id: str, reason: str, severity: str):
# Step 1: Validate authorization
acl_tier = self.get_agent_acl_tier(agent_id)
required_approvers = 2 if acl_tier >= 3 else 1
approvals = self.request_approvals(
agent_id=agent_id,
reason=reason,
severity=severity,
required_count=required_approvers,
timeout_seconds=300 # 5 minutes for critical
)
if len(approvals) < required_approvers:
raise InsufficientApprovalsError(
f"Required {required_approvers}, got {len(approvals)}"
)
# Step 2: Execute immediate actions
if severity == 'critical':
self.immediate_halt(agent_id)
self.isolate_agent(agent_id)
self.revoke_credentials(agent_id)
self.cascade_shutdown(agent_id)
elif severity == 'high':
self.suspend_agent(agent_id)
self.increase_monitoring(agent_id)
# Step 3: Document override
override_record = {
'override_id': str(uuid.uuid4()),
'agent_id': agent_id,
'timestamp': datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),
'reason': reason,
'severity': severity,
'approvals': approvals,
'actions_taken': self.get_actions_taken(agent_id),
'impact': self.assess_impact(agent_id)
}
self.log_to_reflectiondb(override_record)
# Step 4: Notify stakeholders
self.notify_stakeholders(override_record)
return override_record
10.4 Post-Override Procedures¶
post_override:
immediate_actions:
- Preserve evidence (logs, traces, configurations)
- Isolate affected systems
- Begin incident investigation
investigation:
- Root cause analysis
- Timeline reconstruction
- Blast radius assessment
- Determine if escalation needed
recovery:
- System restoration plan
- Security posture validation
- Re-tiering assessment
- Gradual reactivation with enhanced monitoring
post_mortem:
- Incident report within 72 hours
- Lessons learned documentation
- Process improvements
- Training updates
11. Incident Response¶
11.1 Incident Classification¶
| Severity | Description | Response Time | Escalation |
|---|---|---|---|
| P0 - Critical | Active compromise, data breach | 15 minutes | Immediate executive |
| P1 - High | Imminent threat, service down | 1 hour | Security team lead |
| P2 - Medium | Suspicious activity, degraded service | 4 hours | On-call engineer |
| P3 - Low | Policy violation, minor issue | 24 hours | Standard process |
11.2 Response Procedures¶
class IncidentResponse:
def handle_incident(self, incident: Incident):
# Step 1: Triage
severity = self.triage(incident)
# Step 2: Contain
containment_actions = self.contain(incident, severity)
# Step 3: Investigate
investigation = self.investigate(incident)
# Step 4: Eradicate
self.eradicate(investigation.root_cause)
# Step 5: Recover
self.recover(incident.affected_systems)
# Step 6: Post-mortem
self.post_mortem(incident, investigation)
def contain(self, incident, severity):
actions = []
if severity == 'P0':
actions.append(self.isolate_affected_systems())
actions.append(self.revoke_all_credentials())
actions.append(self.enable_emergency_mode())
elif severity == 'P1':
actions.append(self.isolate_affected_agents())
actions.append(self.increase_monitoring())
return actions
11.3 Communication Plan¶
communication_matrix:
P0:
internal:
- ciso: immediate
- ceo: within_5_minutes
- legal: within_10_minutes
external:
- regulators: within_1_hour
- customers: within_2_hours
- media: coordinated_response
P1:
internal:
- security_team: immediate
- engineering_lead: within_15_minutes
- product_owner: within_30_minutes
12. Security Monitoring and Auditing¶
12.1 Security Events to Monitor¶
security_events:
authentication:
- failed_login_attempts
- credential_changes
- privilege_escalations
- session_anomalies
authorization:
- permission_denied
- unauthorized_access
- role_changes
- policy_violations
data_access:
- sensitive_data_access
- bulk_data_export
- unusual_query_patterns
- cross_domain_access
system:
- configuration_changes
- service_restarts
- error_spikes
- resource_exhaustion
12.2 Security Metrics¶
| Metric | Target | Measurement |
|---|---|---|
| Mean Time to Detect | <5 minutes | Alert generation time |
| Mean Time to Respond | <30 minutes | First action time |
| False Positive Rate | <10% | Invalid alerts / total |
| Coverage | >95% | Monitored systems / total |
| Patch Currency | 100% within 30 days | Patched / known vulnerabilities |
12.3 Audit Requirements¶
class SecurityAuditor:
def audit_log_entry(self, event):
return {
'timestamp': datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),
'event_id': str(uuid.uuid4()),
'event_type': event.type,
'severity': event.severity,
'actor': {
'id': event.actor_id,
'type': event.actor_type,
'ip_address': event.ip_address,
'session_id': event.session_id
},
'action': event.action,
'resource': event.resource,
'result': event.result,
'metadata': event.metadata,
'hash': self.calculate_hash(event)
}
13. Compliance and Regulatory Security¶
13.1 Compliance Framework Mapping¶
| Framework | Requirements | ACGP Controls |
|---|---|---|
| GDPR | Data protection, privacy | Encryption, consent management, data minimization |
| CCPA | Consumer privacy rights | Data inventory, deletion mechanisms |
| HIPAA | Health data security | Access controls, audit logs, encryption |
| SOC 2 | Security controls | All security layers, monitoring |
| ISO 27001 | Information security | Complete ISMS implementation |
| AI Act | AI governance | Transparency, human oversight, risk management |
13.2 Regulatory Reporting¶
def generate_compliance_report(framework: str):
report = {
'framework': framework,
'date': datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),
'controls': []
}
for control in get_framework_controls(framework):
status = assess_control(control)
report['controls'].append({
'id': control.id,
'description': control.description,
'status': status,
'evidence': collect_evidence(control),
'gaps': identify_gaps(control, status)
})
report['overall_compliance'] = calculate_compliance_percentage(report)
return report
14. Security Testing Requirements¶
14.1 Testing Categories¶
| Test Type | Frequency | Scope | Success Criteria |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vulnerability Scanning | Daily | All systems | No critical/high vulnerabilities |
| Penetration Testing | Quarterly | External perimeter | No successful breaches |
| Red Team Exercise | Annually | Full environment | Detection within 24 hours |
| Security Code Review | Per release | All code changes | No high-risk findings |
| Compliance Audit | Annually | All controls | 100% compliance |
14.2 Security Test Cases¶
class SecurityTests:
def test_authentication_bypass(self):
# Attempt to bypass authentication
attempts = [
self.test_sql_injection(),
self.test_token_manipulation(),
self.test_session_hijacking(),
self.test_replay_attack()
]
assert all(not attempt.succeeded for attempt in attempts)
def test_privilege_escalation(self):
# Start with low privilege user
user = self.create_low_privilege_user()
# Attempt escalation
escalation_attempts = [
self.attempt_role_manipulation(user),
self.attempt_jwt_tampering(user),
self.attempt_api_exploitation(user)
]
assert all(not attempt.succeeded for attempt in escalation_attempts)
def test_data_exfiltration(self):
# Attempt to exfiltrate sensitive data
methods = [
self.test_bulk_api_calls(),
self.test_side_channel_attacks(),
self.test_error_message_leakage()
]
assert all(method.data_leaked == 0 for method in methods)
15. Conformance Requirements¶
15.1 Security Requirements by Conformance Level¶
Security requirements are tiered by conformance level to enable appropriate security for different deployment scenarios.
15.1.1 Minimal Conformance Security¶
Use Case: Development, testing, batch processing
| Requirement | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| TLS transport | OPTIONAL | May use plain HTTP for local dev |
| Message signatures | OPTIONAL | Not required for ACL-0/1 |
| Encryption at rest | OPTIONAL | SQLite without encryption OK |
| MFA | NOT REQUIRED | Basic auth acceptable |
| HSM | NOT REQUIRED | Software keys OK |
| Audit logs | Session only | No persistence required |
| Zero trust | NOT REQUIRED | Trust local network |
15.1.2 Standard Conformance Security¶
Use Case: Production applications, enterprise deployment
| Requirement | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| TLS 1.3+ | REQUIRED | All external communications |
| Message signatures | REQUIRED | ACL-3+ agents must sign |
| Encryption at rest | REQUIRED | AES-256 for ReflectionDB |
| MFA | REQUIRED | All administrative access |
| HSM | SHOULD | Recommended for key storage |
| Audit logs | 1 year | Persistent, queryable |
| Zero trust | SHOULD | Verify all requests |
| Incident response | REQUIRED | Documented procedures |
| Vulnerability management | REQUIRED | Patch within SLA |
15.1.3 Complete Conformance Security¶
Use Case: Mission-critical systems, regulated industries
| Requirement | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| TLS 1.3+ mutual | REQUIRED | mTLS for all services |
| Message signatures | REQUIRED | All messages signed |
| Encryption at rest | REQUIRED | Field-level encryption |
| MFA | REQUIRED | Hardware tokens preferred |
| HSM | REQUIRED | FIPS 140-2 Level 2+ |
| Audit logs | 7 years | Tamper-evident, compliant |
| Zero trust | REQUIRED | Full implementation |
| Incident response | REQUIRED | Tested quarterly |
| Penetration testing | REQUIRED | Annual third-party |
| SOC 2 Type II | REQUIRED | Maintained certification |
| Emergency override | REQUIRED | Dual authorization |
| Red team exercises | SHOULD | Annual assessment |
15.2 Mandatory Security Controls (All Levels)¶
All ACGP implementations MUST:
15.2.1 Cryptographic Requirements¶
- Use TLS 1.3 or higher for all network communications
- Implement message signing with ES256 (ECDSA with P-256 and SHA-256)
- Encrypt sensitive data at rest with AES-256-GCM
- Rotate keys according to specified schedules
- Use hardware security modules for critical keys (ACL-3+)
15.2.2 Authentication Requirements¶
- Implement multi-factor authentication for administrative access
- Use certificate-based authentication for agents
- Enforce session timeouts and idle lockouts
- Maintain authentication audit logs
15.2.3 Authorization Requirements¶
- Implement role-based access control
- Enforce least privilege principle
- Support attribute-based constraints
- Log all authorization decisions
15.2.4 Monitoring Requirements¶
- Log all security events
- Implement real-time alerting
- Maintain 13 months of audit logs minimum
- Achieve 99% monitoring coverage
15.2.5 Emergency Override Requirements¶
- Support dual authorization for ACL-3+ agents
- Execute overrides within 5 minutes for critical incidents
- Document all overrides with full audit trail
- Notify stakeholders according to severity matrix
15.3 Security Certification Requirements¶
Implementations SHOULD obtain: - SOC 2 Type II certification - ISO 27001 certification - Relevant industry certifications (HIPAA, PCI-DSS as applicable)
15.4 Security Update Requirements¶
- Critical patches: Within 24 hours
- High severity: Within 7 days
- Medium severity: Within 30 days
- Security advisories: Within 4 hours of discovery
16. References¶
Normative References¶
- ACGP-1000: Core Protocol Specification
- ACGP-1001: Terminology and Definitions
- ACGP-1002: Architecture Specification
- ACGP-1003: Message Formats & Wire Protocol
- ACGP-1005: ARS-CTQ-ACL Integration Framework
- RFC 2119: Key words for use in RFCs
- NIST 800-53: Security and Privacy Controls
Cryptographic Standards¶
- FIPS 140-3: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
- NIST SP 800-57: Key Management Recommendations
- RFC 8018: PKCS #5 Password-Based Cryptography
- RFC 7518: JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
Security Frameworks¶
- OWASP Top 10: Web Application Security Risks
- MITRE ATT&CK: Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge
- Zero Trust Architecture: NIST SP 800-207
- Cloud Security Alliance: Security Guidance v4.0
End of ACGP-1007